Kant / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals

Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals

In his work, the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Immanuel Kant utilizes an innovative method to overcome the tendency of relativizing morals to some non-rational and contingent standard (such as emotions as his contemporary, David Hume, had done) and offers an interesting analysis of morality from the perspective of universal principles demanded by the very nature of a rational moral agent.  He defends the universality and absolute character of moral principles by positing categorical imperatives, known a priori (i.e. before experience).  The scope of his work is clearly stated in the preface: to simply establish “the supreme principle of morality” (255).  The method that Kant employs to discover and formulate this principle is to work from the common experience of moral obligation and, by analyzing this experience, to seek the a priori prerequisites necessary for the possibility of such an experience.

The progression of his argument follows logically connected steps: the experience of moral obligation leads to positing freedom; freedom leads to the idea that the will is autonomous (i.e. able to have causal efficacy apart from external influences: desires, inclinations and so forth); the will’s autonomy leads to its formulation of a universal principle of morality as the ideal foundation of all actions of rational beings.    

What rule can explain the absolute and universal character of moral obligation?  According to Kant, the only rule/law that fits this requirement is a categorical imperative, which commands certain behaviors as necessary without reference to any subordinate ends, as contrasted with hypothetical imperatives, which can only command something as a means to an end (265).  His first and most fundamental formulation of this imperative clearly emphasizes universality: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (268).  From this formulation, it is clear that an act of lying could never be permitted because, if a liar sincerely intended his untruthfulness to be universally commanded, his intention would cancel out the very meaning of truth and would thereby be self-contradictory.

 It is noteworthy that the categorical imperative is merely formal: referring neither to the object of the action, nor to any consequences/results of the action, but merely to the maxim itself, intended as the guiding principle.  Although Kant offers a compelling argument for excluding any reference to the object and consequences of an action – traditionally considered as important elements in moral judgment – by pointing out that the contingent character of particular objects and situations compromises the universality of moral obligations, his final position ends up being alarmingly “content-less”.  Man is to judge his morality purely according to how his intention conforms to the universal principle, which has its origin in himself.  The problem with this position is that, without any positive content (such as the notion of a transcendent natural law indicating certain objects of the will as good or evil), arguments could plausibly be made by people, who truly feel themselves to be intending universality, for actions that are, in fact, objectively evil.  In addition, the categorical imperative is not able to handle moral questions specific to particular situations.  For example, the moral law binding for a man committed to celibacy could never be willed universally without losing the man’s very possibility for existence; but such a law would certainly be appropriate for those people whose function in society required celibacy (for example, priests).

The second formulation of the categorical imperative could be seen as Kant’s attempt to satisfy the need for acknowledging an objective content in morality.  According to this formulation one ought to treat oneself and others “in every case as an end withal, never as means only” (272).  Kant necessarily deduces this formulation from his idea that the will of each rational being is self-legislating (though, paradoxically, also subject to its own law).  Although the second formulation is laudable for the dignity it ascribes to each person, it seems to contradict a basic point of Kant’s epistemology (i.e. his theory on the way man obtains knowledge) as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason.  According to his epistemology, man cannot know a thing as it is in itself (noumenon), but merely as it appears to him (phenomenon), the knowing subject, through forms of knowing imposed by him on otherwise unintelligible sense perceptions.  However, the second formulation implies a knowledge of “what is” because, by saying that a person is an end in himself and therefore deserves manifestations of respect appropriate to this fact, Kant is essentially saying that what is should inform what ought to be (which in fact was the basis of most classical views on morality – founded on metaphysics).  This fact is in complete contradiction to his epistemology and to his oft repeated principle that morality must be derived completely a priori, without any reference to human nature, anthropology, the objective good in real things and so forth.

In the final analysis, Kant’s effort to found morality solely on an a priori principle leaves much to be desired.  By placing the origin of the imperatives in the subject, he opens the door to moral subjectivism; what is to prevent a person who is a “self-legislator” from deciding to modify his own laws?  In spite of his best efforts to the contrary, Kant’s Fundamental Principles seems to be only a short step away from falling into the very moral relativism that he strove to eliminate. 

 

Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Trans. W. Hastie, ed. Wallace Brockway et al.. Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1952. 34pp.