A Timeline on the Problem of Evil in Medieval Thought
The problem of evil has always intrigued me as it has become one of the main arguments against the existence of God. This is because, as the Catechism says, “there is not a single aspect of the Christian message that is not in part an answer to the question of evil.”[1]It has been interesting to revisit this topic from a historical point of view, looking at the three primary philosophers and theologians who deal extensively with this problem during the Middle Ages: Augustine of Hippo, the Pseudo- Dionysius, and Thomas Aquinas.
Augustine of Hippo
For Saint Augustine, the problem of evil was very significant due to his relationship with the Manicheans. This group was a heretical group that, at its core, sought to solve the problem of evil. The Manicheans desired a rational and complete understanding of the world. For this reason, they despised the Christians, whose belief was based on faith and contained many mysteries.[2]They were agnostics who believed that, from the beginning, there were two forces at work: the light and the dark. This dualism occurred in harmony until the dark tried to penetrate the dominion of the light and, from that time on, there has been a struggle between the two, which is the cause of suffering and evil. Salvation can be gained through wisdom, and humanity should participate in the work of returning to the original state in which the light and dark lived harmoniously. It included Christian, Jewish, and Oriental elements and sought to unite them. [3]
This religion appealed to Augustine for three reasons. First of all, the idea of salvation through wisdom resonated in his heart because of his deep yearning for knowledge and understanding. Second of all, Manicheanism provided some easy and practical (at least in appearance) answers to the questions of life: questions Augustine always carried in his heart. Finally, it provided, at least in his mind previous to his conversion, a very valid and logical response to the problem of evil. For this reason, after his conversion, Augustine sought to challenge and correct the teachings of the Manicheans, in the context of Christianity. In other words, he wanted to show the Manicheans that Christianity contained the true answers to the questions they were so preoccupied with. Because so much of the Manichean doctrine revolved around explaining evil, it was essential for Augustine to find an appropriate response to the problem of evil within the context of Christianity. For Augustine, the key to this resolution was the origin of evil.
Christians believe that God created everything. It is one of the central dogmas of our faith. Another reality is that there is evil in the world; therefore, evil had to come from somewhere. Following this logic, it would then follow that God created evil. This would seem to create many conflicts to other Dogmas of Christianity, mainly what we know about God: that he is all-loving, all-good, and all-powerful. In other words, this logic provides three negative implications to our understanding of the attributes of God. First, if God is all-loving, then he would not have created evil. Due to the fact that evil exists, and that evil is not an action of love; then, this means that he is not all-loving. Second, if God is all-good, he could not have created something which is not good; but, because evil exists, and evil is not good, God cannot be all-good. Third, if God is all powerful, he could have created a world with no evil. Therefore, he is either a) not all powerful or b) he simply chose to create a world with evil, which would make him not all-good, which means returning to the second conflict. This is why the problem of evil was so important to Augustine. If there was not a true resolution to it within Christianity, then Christianity, and the claims of Christianity, would be false, and the Manichean system would logically make more sense.
The way that Augustine was able to resolve this great issue is truly remarkable because he was the first one to truly explore it and be fruitful in providing an adequate, if not complete, resolution. He understood that the aforementioned conflicts rested on the premise: evil was created. He knew that if evil was created then God must have created it. Consequently, he came to the conclusion that evil was not created. Naturally, this leads to the question about the origin and essence of evil.
In dealing with the origin of evil, Augustine deduced that evil does not originate from God, but from the created will. “The cause of good things is the divine goodness, whereas the cause of evil is the created will which turns away from the immutable Good: evil is a turning away of the created will from the immutable and infinite Good.” [4]Therefore, the origin of evil is not God, but the human will. It is a departure of the human will from its original plan to do good. Furthermore, when dealing with the origin of evil he explains that more important than origin or source, is essence. Augustine explains to the Manicheans: “You ask me, Whence is evil? I ask you in return, What is evil? Which is the more reasonable question? Are those right who ask whence a thing is, when they do not know what it is; or he who thinks it necessary to inquire first what it is, in order to avoid the gross absurdity of searching for the origin of a thing unknown?” [5]In other words, the fundamental discussion must be on the essence of evil because, without knowing the essence, what is being discussed cannot be known; and therefore, any discussion on the matter is pointless. Therefore, Augustine turns to the consideration of the essence of evil. Continuing his writings to the Manicheans, who claimed both that the essence of evil is nature and that evil is contrary to nature, he says:
You say that evil is that which is contrary to nature; for no one is so mentally blind as not to see that, in every kind, evil is that which is contrary to the nature of the kind. But the establishment of this doctrine is the overthrow of your heresy. For evil is no nature, if it is contrary to nature. Now, according to you, evil is a certain nature and substance. Moreover, whatever is contrary to nature must oppose nature and seek its destruction. For nature means nothing else than that which anything is conceived of as being in its own kind.[6]
It is important to note that nature, in this context, means everything that is of being, as opposed to non-being. Evil therefore, falls in the category of non-being, which simply means: without essence. In other words, evil is the absence of an essence, not an essence in itself. What Augustine is explaining to the Manicheans in this text is that evil cannot be nature and contrary to nature at the same time; it is illogical. The conclusion is therefore, that evil is not nature and therefore not created by God, because God creates nature or being, not non-being. In fact, non-being cannot be created because, as aforementioned, it is an absence not a presence. This is what Augustine means when he says, “Accordingly, when the Catholic Church declares that God is the author of all natures and substances, those who understand this understand at the same time that God is not the author of evil. For how can He who is the cause of the being of all things be at the same time the cause of their not being.” [7]
While Saint Augustine dealt with other aspects of the problem of evil, this is his most important contribution to its resolution: that evil is not nature or being, but non-being. This builds the foundation for future discussion on the problem and continues to be at the center of the teachings of the Church on the problem today.
Pseudo-Dionysius
Pseudo-Dionysius (a Christian writer of the early medieval ages who passed off his writings as those of Dionysius, the apostle of Paul) is very preoccupied in his writings with the goodness of God. It is only natural then, that he dealt extensively with the problem of evil. It is clearly evident in his writings that he concurs with Augustine’s premise of evil as a non-being. He then expands on Augustine’s idea of the relationship between good and being. Augustine said, “inasmuch as we exists we are good.”[8]The Pseudo-Dionysius takes this as his starting point for his own analysis on the essence of being, goodness, and evil: “That evil has no positive being of itself is clear from the fact that good and being are synonymous: everything which has being proceeds from good and, as being, is good.” [9]Therefore, something has being in so far as it is good: the less good it has, means the less being. Pseudo-Dionysius further explains it:
All creatures in so far as the have being are good and come from the Good, and in so far as they are deprived of the Good, neither are they good nor have they being…evil is a depravation or privation: it consists, not simply in non-being or in the absence of being, but rather in the absence of a good that ought to be present…evil consists in the depravation of the good that ought to be there and actually is not.” [10]
In other words, everything that is fully good is also fully in being. When it is not fully good, when it is missing some goodness, we refer to that missing goodness as evil.
The key is that all of nature, all of creation, everything that is, is good in essence because it is being. Evil then only occurs as an absence of some or all of that good which is, by nature, in being. This assertion had many serious implications because it defended the innate goodness of man and creation, which was being questioned in many currents of thought of the time. He explains that because man has being, because he exists: he is good. In this logic then, an evil man is good in essence, in his existence; but is evil because of the good qualities which he lacks. “[Bad human beings,] are called evil, in virtue of ‘the deficiency of good qualities and activities, and in virtue of their failure and fall therefrom due to their own weakness.’” [11]This is one of the greatest contributions of Pseudo-Dionysius to the apologetical work of the problem of evil. He defends the innate goodness of man, while still explaining the cause of an evil-man. He also explains the origin of that deficiency. It is because of the fall of man; and, because the proper weakness that accompanies the fallen human state. This means that, even when evil is defined as deprivation of the good, the origin of evil is humans, not good. This is possible because evil is non-being. While humans cannot create being, they can revoke or deny that being, causing non-being: causing evil.
Finally, Pseudo-Dionysius applies this same logic to physical, non-moral evil. “That which is the contrary to nature, is the deprivation of things of nature. So that there is not an evil nature; but this is evil to nature, the inability to accomplish the things of one’s proper nature.” [12]In other words, nature is good in itself; yet, due to the fall of man, it often cannot fulfill its natural functions. This is what evil is according to Pseudo-Dionysius: when something is not what it ought to be, what it was created to be.
Thomas Aquinas
The last person to consider in this synthesis of the problem of evil in Medieval philosophy, is the great Thomas Aquinas. Considered one of the greatest minds in human history, Thomas was a Dominican friar who spend a great majority of his life studying and writing. His famous Summa Theologicais one of the most read and studied books in philosophy. It is a compendium of all of the main theological teachings of the Catholic Church, and it presents the reasoning for almost all points of Christian theology in the West. It was, and continues to be, used as an instructional manual for the formation of priests and faithful laity. Naturally, the Problem of evil, as one of the major points of contention in theology and philosophy, is thoroughly discussed in the Summa.
Before delving into Aquinas’ treatment on evil itself, it is important to mention that he generally agreed with the Pseudo-Dionysius in the relationship between goodness and being. When explaining goodness in his Summa, he supports Dionysius thesis that being and goodness are the same. Thomas does differ slightly, however, by saying that “goodness is superadded to being.” He then goes on to explain: “every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness…Hence it follows that every being as such is good.” [13] Again, the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius, who Aquinas quotes several times, is apparent. Aquinas agrees with him on the innate goodness of man. Still speaking on this goodness, he begins explaining evil by saying, “No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.”[14]It is evident then, that the emphasis is on the goodness of the being.
God is being itself, and that being means infinite goodness. Therefore, Creation is a communication of that being of God. In other words, He wills to create the world as an expression of Himself, which is this infinite goodness. For this reason, God cannot will evil because He Himself is not evil, but infinite goodness. Furthermore, Aquinas explains, “God could not have created [evil,] since it is not creatable, but it only exists as a privation in what itself, as being, is good.” [15]This is clearly the same conclusion that both Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius arrived at. Aquinas, however, then goes a step further by explaining that it is impossible to create a non-being: only being can be created. He is careful here, however, because he by no means wants to imply that evil is unreal or simply illusory. The evil is real in a being, but it cannot be real outside of a being; in other words, it is not a being on its own. Furthermore, evil has no meaning on its own. If it has been agreed then that evil is a privation of something, then, without that thing, the evil would not exist. Evil is dependent on a created being, and therefore, does not have an independent essence: it cannot exist outside of something.
Up to this point, Aquinas is building on what has been previously written about evil; at this point however, he explores the question of evil in a different way than Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius. He deals with physical evil and moral evil separately. In regard to physical evil, he concedes that it “was certainly permitted by God and it can in a sense be even said to have been willed by God. God did not will it for its own sake, of course, per se, but He willed a universe, a natural order, which involved at least the possibility of physical defect and suffering.” [16]This must have been a staggering statement at the time. It was a concession that God, at least to some degree, allowed evil. This, of course, has massive implications about the Truth of God; and it is why Aquinas quickly explains himself. God, he explains, does not will corruption for its own sake, but permits it because it is required in the perfect universe he created. “The universe requires,” Aquinas says, “that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruption of things.” [17]Fredrick Copleston, the renown historian of philosophy writes about Aquinas’ theory on physical evil saying:
In treating of physical evils, therefore, St. Thomas tends to treat God as an artist and the universe as a work of art. The perfection of that work of art requires a variety of beings, among which will be found beings which are mortal and capable of suffering, so that God may be said to have willed physical evil not per sebut per accidens, for the sake of a good, the good of the whole universe. [18]
In other words, Saint Thomas claims that in order for this universe to be perfect, it needed to include things that are, at least, susceptible to corruption. This by no means is to say that God created physical evil; it simply means that God permits these susceptibilities for the perfection of the universe.
His attitude towards moral evil however, was a different story for Aquinas and the key to understand this lies in God’s creation. As mentioned previously, when God created the world, He created some things which were corruptible. This is good because it allows for the functioning of the perfect world. However, the corruptibility in some of creation is not good per se. When God created humans on the other hand, he created them as free agents, capable of choosing good or evil. This freedom is a good thing as will be discussed, this does mean however, that man has the freedom to choose evil. The difference between the two then is the fact that while the world requires some form of corruption, some sort of evil, for perfection, man is not required to do evil for the perfection of creation. “The perfection of the universe requires that man should be free, it did not require that he should misuses this freedom, should sin.” [19]The corruptibility of creation is necessary, and so is man’s freedom; man choosing evil however, is not necessary.
Aquinas therefore, understands that the cause of moral evil is directly related to man’s freedom. God created man as a free agent with the ability to choose between good and evil. The question then becomes: why is man required to be free for the perfection of creation? “Go did not will moral disorder or sin in any sense, but he permitted it. Why? For the sake of a greater good, that man might be free and that he might love and serve God of his own free choice.” [20]In other words, there is a greater good that makes the potentiality (yet not necessarily the requirement) for evil, worth it. This greater good is freedom, and it is a greater good because it allows us to love God. Without freedom, love would not be possible. This is because love, for it to be love, must be freely given. If we did not have the option to not love God, then it would not be love but merely submission. God created freedom and yes, this freedom is an incredibly good. The freedom does however, produce a situation in which evil can occur. It is a byproduct of freedom and not the original intention for it.
Finally, Aquinas explains that the human will must always chose good. This might seem naïve on his part, but he explains than even when someone chooses evil, it is chosen because they perceive it as a good. In other words, the human will must always choose something which, at least in appearances, seems good. For example, “the adulterer, says St. Thomas, does not will the evil, the sin, precisely as such; he wills the sensible pleasure of an act which involves evil.” [21]In other words, the adulterer chooses evil, not because he wants something bad, but precisely because he thinks that the pleasure derived from the act is good. This is why Saint Thomas says that when man wills evil, he is doing so because he thinks it is a good in some way. Therefore, the will, the freedom of man will always lead him towards choosing, at least what is perceived to man, as good. Father Copleston summarizes Aquinas view on evil in a beautiful, simple, yet profound way. He says:
St. Thomas’s philosophical answer to the problem of evil in its relation to God can be summed up in two statements, first that God did not will moral evil in any sense whatever but only permitted it for a greater good than could be attained by preventing it, that is, by not making man free, and secondly that though God did not will physical evil for its own sake, He may be said to have willed certain physical evils per accidens, for the perfection of the universe.” [22]
Influence of Medieval Thought on the Problem of Evil
The Medieval response to the problem of evil has influenced the treatment of the problem for generation. The influence of Augustine, Aquinas, and Pseudo-Dionysius is apparent in the contemporary apologetical work of the Church regarding this problem. Their thought is apparent in great Church documents such as the Catechism of the Catholic Church. It is also apparent in the writings of great Church figures of recent times such as Benedict XVI and John Paul II. Venerable Fulton Sheen, one of the greatest apologists and philosophers of the Twentieth Century says this: “Evil is very much like darkness, it is the absence of light; it has no purpose inside of itself… it has no substance of its own.” [23]The influence of all three of the great minds of Medieval philosophy discussed in this paper can clearly be seen in this quote; and this is simply one example of the great intellectual treasure that Augustine, Aquinas, and Pseudo-Dionysius left us when it comes to resolving the problem of evil.
Bibliography
Arendzen, John. "Manichæism." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 9. New York: Robert
Appleton Company, 1910. 21 Aug.2019 <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09591a.htm>.
Augustine.On Christian Doctrine. Translated by D. W. Robertson. Indianapolis, In.: Bobbs-
Merrill Educational Pub., 1970.
--- On the Morals of The Catholic Church and the Morals of the Manichaeans. Edited by Kevin
Knight. Translated by Richard Stothert. Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co.,
1887.
Aquinas, Thomas, Laurence Shapcote, John Mortensen, and Enrique Alarcón. Summa Theologiae.Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012.
Catechism of the Catholic Church. 2nd ed. Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1992.
Copleston, Frederick C. A History of Philosophy: Medieval Philosophy. Vol. 2. Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1963.
Pseudo-Dionysius. Dionysius the Areopagite, Works. Translated by John Parker. London, 1897.
Sheen, Fulton J. "Human Freedom." Bishop Sheen Today(audio blog), 1965. Accessed July 20, 2019. http://www.bishopsheentoday.com/listen-to-sheen/the-sheen-catechism/.
Widengren, Mani and Manichaeism (1965); J. Darmesteter, in: REJ, 28 (1889), 1–15; H. Puech, Le Manichéisme (1949).
[1]CCC 309
[2]Arendzen
[3]Widengren
[4]Copleston, 84.
[5]Augustine Manicheans, Ch. 2
[6]Augustine Manicheans, 2.
[7]Augustine Manicheans, 3.
[8]Augustine Christian Doctrine i, 42.
[9]Copleston, 98.
[10]Ibid, 99.
[11]Copleston, 99.
[12]Pseudo-Dionysius, XXVI.
[13]Summa Q. 5 A. 3 Respondeo
[14]Summa Q. 5 A. 3 Ad Secundum
[15]Copleston, 371.
[16]Copleston, 372.
[17]Summa Q. 49 A. 2 Respondeo
[18]Copleston, 373.
[19]Ibid.
[20]Ibid.
[21]Copleston, 371.
[22]Ibid, 374.
[23]Sheen
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